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Introduction 
The development and dynamics of regional economic integration in Africa are 
severely influenced by the transformation of the trade relations between African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU), imposed by the 
Cotonou agreement (2000). Economic relations formerly based on unilateral trade 
preferences provided by the EU are envisaged to be based on Economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) that should regulate trade and cooperation establishing new trade 
regimes between the EU and ACP regions selected by clear criteria. As the EU is the 
biggest trade partner and the main donor for most ACP states, the strategy has the 
potential to impulse a significant development impetus.   
EPA regions do not cover the existing regional economic communities (RECs) 
in Africa which complicates the already delicate situation of dispersed capacity and 
overlapping membership of African countries in different integration schemes. 
Although EPAs aim at the promotion of regional integration their immediate impact 
could hardly be regarded as strictly positive.  
 
1. The process of regional economic integration in Africa 
Although it is a stated priority goal of state and government leaders since the early 
year of independence in the middle of the XX century, the process of political integration 
in Africa is progressing slowly, mainly due to lack of political will on the part of African 
countries. In the area of economic integration, which has a much shorter history, achieved 
results, albeit insufficient against the stated objectives, are significantly more. 
The Treaty for establishment of the African economic community (TAEC) is 
signed in 1991 and comes into force in 1994. It establishes the AEC as a part of the 
African union (AU). The Treaty defines six stages that should be completed for the 
gradual creation of the AEC for a period of 34 years (TAEC, Art. 6). The Treaty adopts 
an integration approach that to a great extent depends on the success of integration 
processes of the regional economic communities. The Treaty explicitly states that the 
AEC will be established mainly based on coordination and gradual integration of the 
activities of existing RECs. Thus RECs are defined as the building blocks of the AEC. 
The idea of this stage approach is that integration should firstly be ensured at a 
regional level through the creation and strengthening of the RECs which in a certain 
moment will merge into the AEC. 
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The first stage includes the strengthening of existing RECs and creation of new 
ones where there are no existing and should last till 1999. At the time when the TAEC 
came into force in Africa existed the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which included all countries 
on the continent. Until 2001 AU accepts three more communities – the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD) and the East African Community (EAC). In 2006 a decision was 
made that no other RECs will be acknowledged as building blocks of the AEC. 
The second stage is with an 8 years duration and has the objective RECs to 
decrease or abolish tariffs, quotas and other restrictions to intraregional trade. Together 
with this is envisaged coordination of policies in the areas of trade, finance, transport, 
communications, industry and energy as well as coordination and harmonization of the 
activities of existing RECs. There is some progress in the strengthening of many REC 
sectors and despite the challenges the efforts are directed towards the requirements of 
the second stage of AEC establishment. 
The third stage should be completed till 2017 and envisages all trade barriers 
to be abolished through the creation of free trade areas in the RECs and the 
enforcement of common customs tariffs through the creation of customs unions (CU). 
Almost all RECs have completed the third stage to some extent except UMA,   IGAD 
and CEN-SAD. Differing from all other RECs, the CU is the first step of the creation of 
the EAC (in 2005). Progress towards the accomplishment of the third stage of the 
establishment of AEC is satisfactory, though for the communities that have not 
accomplished the set goals in periods of relative tranquillity the future accomplishment 
will be hampered by the current conflicts as in the case with UMA.  
The fourth stage is to be completed until 2019 and the goal is the establishment 
of an African customs union through harmonization of the common customs tariffs of 
all RECs. As a positive step towards the completion of this objective could be seen the 
launch of the tripartite FTA between COMESA, SADC and EAC in 2015 through which 
the three communities abolish trade barriers between each other. 
There is no progress made in completing the fifth and sixth stage – the 
establishment of an African common market and of a continental economic and 
monetary union. These stages should be completed respectively in 2023 and 2028. 
Currently there are 16 African regional economic communities, 7 of them are 
recognized and serve as pillars for the establishment of AEC (see Annex for maps). 
CEN-SAD is and integration and harmonization framework aiming to become the 
leading REC in Africa. COMESA has the mandate to create a fully integrated and 
internationally competitive REC in which apply freedoms of movement of goods, people, 
services and capital. The stated goal of EAC is the development of a prospering, 
competitive, secure and politically united Eastern Africa. Concentrated in ECCAS are 
4/5 of African forests, there are lots of minerals and fuels, but frequent conflicts hinder 
the unfolding of the community’s potential. The main goal of ECOWAS, where leading 
is the economy of Nigeria, is to encourage regional economic cooperation and to face 
the development challenges. IGAD’s activities are aimed at sustainment of peace and 
security, as well as at development and integration issues. The goals of SADC, with 
leading economy Republic of South Africa, are not limited in the field of trade although 
it is the main engine of integration processes there. Table 1 presents main economic 
indicators for the RECs regarded as building blocks of the AEC. 
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Table 1. Main data on selected RECs (2014) 
 CEN-SAD COMESA ЕАС EUСАS ECOWAS IGAD SADC 
Stage of integration PTA FTA CM PTA CU PTA CU (partial) 
Member states 23 19 5 10 15 7 15 
LCDs 16 11 5 6 12 6 8 
Area (mln. sq. кm) 13427 11603 1823 6640 5115 5210 9862 
Area (% of Africa) 50,9 38,6 6,1 22,0 13,9 17,3 32,8 
Population (mln.)  508 459 149 121 340 226 286 
Population (%of Africa) 53,5 42,9 13,6 13,3 14,1 20,4 27,0 
Population density 37,8 39,5 81,5 18,2 66,4 43,3 29,0 
Employment 33,1 38,0 43,3 38,3 33,4 40,1 36,7 
GDP (mln. USD) 934084 577740 98396 200737 419150 166164 648253 
GDP (USD p.c.) 1838,4 1259,6 662,1 1662,6 1233,9 736,4 2269,6 
GNI (mln. USD) 891064 561737 94761 173503 392322 160629 624503 
Trade (mln. USD) 562755 303298 50735 171910 267585 61006 421429 
Trade (% of Africa) 45,8 24,7 4,1 14,0 21,8 5,0 34,3 
Imports (% of GDP) 29,7 29,9 36,7 24,8 26,5 27,5 33,0 
Exports (% of GDP) 30,5 22,6 14,9 60,8 37,3 9,2 32,0 
Trade balance (mln. USD) 7609 -41868 -21473 72298 45414 -30318 -6370 
Source: African Development Indicators and own calculations. 
 
There has been significant progress in the implementation of the stages of the 
creation of African economic community. Some regional economic communities fulfil their 
obligations under the AEC Treaty on schedule, in some there is a delay, and some are 
even ahead of the deadlines. Although the regional communities are making a lot of effort 
for the realisation of the first three stages set in the Treaty by adopting a phased abolition 
of customs duties in intraregional trade, there are many differences among them – some 
regional economic communities still cannot create a free trade area, while others already 
have a working customs union. The pace of progress is not the same and overlapping 
membership of many countries in two or more regional communities (see Figure 1) makes 
it obligatory for strategic decisions to be taken as well as action towards the creation of a 
continental free trade area as a first step towards a continental customs union, a common 
market and the ultimate goal – a fully functioning African economic community. 
 
 
Figure 1. Euler diagram showing the relationships between various multinational 
African organisations 
Source: Created by author. 
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Progress in African integration is mixed across sectors, regional economic 
communities, and member states. There have been some strides in trade, 
communications, macroeconomic policy, and transport. Some regional economic 
communities have made significant progress in trade liberalization and facilitation 
(COMESA), in free movement of people (ECOWAS), in infrastructure (SADC and 
EAC), and in peace and security (ECOWAS and SADC).Overall, however, there are 
substantial gaps between the goals and achievements of most regional economic 
communities, particularly in increasing intraregional trade, macroeconomic 
convergence, production, and physical connectivity. 
 
2. The Economic partnership agreements of the EU 
EPAs are trade and cooperation agreements establishing a new trade regime 
between the EU and the ACP countries. They are designed to create WTO-
compatible, development oriented reciprocal trading arrangements between Europe 
and its traditional developing country trading partners, while encouraging regional 
integration and drawing improved trade capacity building and other aid interventions 
into the developing partner regions. The agreements aim at covering not only trade in 
goods but also in services and other trade-related areas. 
EPAs were initially designed to create an entirely new framework for the flow of 
trade and investment between the EU and the ACP countries, encouraging, amongst 
other positive factors, regional integration between ACP countries. The ACP EPA 
countries group themselves into seven regions: five in Africa, one in the Caribbean 
and one in the Pacific.  
 
2.1. Principles of the EPAs  
Addressing the weaknesses of the Lomé Conventions, the EU and the ACP 
agreed to radically reform the ACP-EU trade relationship through the negotiation of 
the EPAs. The Cotonou Agreement sets out four principles for EPAs: 
1. Development. EPA negotiations must be placed in the context of the 
overall development objectives of ACP countries and of the CPA. To be of benefit to 
the ACP, EPAs must be ‘economically meaningful, politically sustainable, and socially 
acceptable’. Hence, EPAs are not just ordinary agreements on trade. Rather, they are 
intended to be development-oriented trade arrangements to foster development and 
economic growth in ACP countries which will ultimately contribute to poverty 
eradication. 
2. Reciprocity. The most important element of an EPA is the establishment 
of an FTA, which will progressively abolish substantially all trade restrictions between 
both parties. This is a radically new element in ACP-EU trade relations and also a 
necessary requirement to make the EPAs WTO-compatible. For the first time, ACP 
countries will have to open up, on a reciprocal basis, their own markets to EU products 
in order to retain their preferential access to the EU market. The rationale for 
reciprocity rests on the principle that liberalisation of ACP markets towards the EU will 
increase competition within ACP economies, thereby stimulating local and foreign 
(including EU) investment and the necessary adjustment of their economies, leading 
to growth and development. 
3. Regionalism. The EU clearly envisages negotiations with ACP regional 
groupings which are in a position to do so, though it has not ruled out the possibility of 
concluding agreements with single countries in exceptional cases, as in some of the 
interim deals. The principle of basing future trade cooperation on regional integration 
stems from the conviction that regional integration is a key step towards further 
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integration into the world economy, as well as an instrument to stimulate investment 
and lock in the necessary trade reforms. 
4. Differentiation. Considerable weight is given to differentiation and special 
treatment, which affirms the North-South nature of the relationship. EPAs must take into 
account the different levels of development of the contracting parties. EPAs should 
provide sufficient scope for flexibility, special and differential treatment and asymmetry. 
In particular, LDCs, small and vulnerable economies, landlocked countries and small 
islands should be able to benefit from special and differential treatment. 
Hence, the EPA negotiations constitute a shift in ACP-EU trade cooperation 
relations, ending an era of non-reciprocal trade preferences and replacing the all-ACP-
EU trading arrangement by several separate agreements that are negotiated between 
the EU and the ACP negotiating regions, with the objective of fostering regional 
integration in the ACP. In essence, the EPAs should thus be essentially enhanced, 
development-oriented free trade areas between ACP regional groupings and the EU. 
They aim to cover not only trade in goods and agricultural products, but also in 
services, and should address tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers to trade. As 
proposed by the European Commission, other trade-related areas would also be 
covered, including by increased cooperation between the EU and the ACP, such as 
competition, investment, protection of intellectual property rights, trade facilitation, 
trade and environment, trade and labour standards, consumer policy regulation and 
consumer health protection, food security, public procurement, etc. 
 
2.2. EPA regions – current state of negotiations 
EPA negotiations with specific regions are assumed to be the best possibility, 
as since the very beginning it was clear that it is practically impossible for the EU to 
conclude a multilateral agreement with all ACP countries. Moreover, the EU has 
always seen the regional approach in its external relations as the better one, because 
it is a driver for growth and economic development.  
Eligibility criteria for areas that may be concluded EPAs are clear enough. The 
difficulty lies in their application to the specific context of the existing structure of 
African regional groupings. In this context, the EC supports RECs that: first, are large 
enough to constitute a "pole of attraction" that would lead to a trade and economic 
dynamics; second, are aimed at the formation of the customs union; third, are willing 
to remove non-tariff barriers to future common market; and fourth, have effective 
mechanisms for the implementation of the decisions taken. 
However, the EPA negotiation process with regional blocks that are created 
specifically with this purpose has a lot of shortcomings, the main of them being that 
EPA regions are too heterogeneous and partly overlap with already existing integration 
initiatives. This hinders negotiations and causes the very slow progress. As a solution 
to this problem interim agreements have been proposed in order to avoid the negative 
effects resulting from the expiry of the exception made by the WTO.  
Almost in all regions one of the most contentious issues that are still not 
resolved is the most-favoured-nation rule. According to it signatory countries in the 
future cannot treat the EU less favourable than any other trading partner. EU insists 
on the inclusion of the most-favoured-nation clause. In return ACP countries could 
exclude certain products from liberalisation, while EU fully opens its own market. 
Another serious problem that characterises all African EPA regions is that in all 
of them there are least developed countries (LDCs) which could use the preferential 
trade regime under the “Everything but Arms” initiative instead of the reciprocal 
liberalisation envisaged by EPAs.  
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West Africa  
The West Africa EPA region encompasses the 15 member-states of ECOWAS 
and Mauritania. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are the two countries that have signed acting 
interim EPAs with the EU – they export to the EU without duties and restrictions while 
they have to gradually liberalise their market for 80% of the EU exports. 
In West Africa region, the problems are similar to those of other negotiating 
groups. First, there is a complicated overlapping of two monetary unions within 
ECOWAS, while Mauritania is not a member of any REC, but joined the region to be 
able to negotiate EPA. At the same time negotiations are complicated by the different 
level of development – all countries except Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria are 
among the LDCs. 
However, a comprehensive EPA with West Africa was signed by the heads of 
state on February 6th, 2014. The agreement has to be ratified by the parliaments of 
the countries in West Africa and the European Parliament. It gives priority to West 
Africa, taking into account the existing differences in development between the EU 
and the region. While the EU opens its market fully, West Africa will abolish import 
duties only partially for 20-year transitional period. The proposed regional market 
access is in full compliance with the common external tariff of the ECOWAS, adopted 
in October 2013, which sets the basis for a customs union in the community. EPA 
implementation and application of the Common Customs Tariff by ECOWAS will 
reinforce each other. 
  
Southern African Development Community 
The negotiating countries in the SADC region are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. The other six members of SADC 
are negotiating their EPA within other regional groups. 
Negotiations with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland were concluded on July 15, 2014 and the signed EPA is pending 
ratification. Angola has an option to join the agreement in the future. The agreement 
guarantees duty and quota free market access to EU for Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. South Africa can take advantage of new 
opportunities for market access in addition to the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), which currently rules trade relations with the EU. The 
EPS gives asymmetrical market access for the partners in the region. Countries can 
choose to protect sensitive products from full liberalisation. 
Under the terms of the current interim EPA all products originating from 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland have duty and quota free access to 
EU. Since these countries are members of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), their commitment to trade liberalisation is already implemented within the 
TDCA. The process of negotiations with the SADC group is complicated due to 
possible discrepancies in the regimes of SACU and EPA, the specific position of South 
Africa, the different level of development and often conflicting interests of the members 
of the group. Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique are among the LDCs and as such 
may benefit from the scheme "Everything but Arms", while other countries trade under 
the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). This, together with the strong position 
of South Africa to all other countries, hinders the negotiations on the most-favoured-
nation treatment. 
The special position of South Africa deserves more attention as it further adds 
to the complexity of the negotiations. South Africa was not originally party to the SADC 
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EPA. Its participation was requested by the SADC in 2006. South Africa is the largest 
trading partner of EU in the framework of SADC and has already signed the TDCA. 
This means that the country is in a favoured position than other countries in the region, 
since it has no need to hurry with the EPA negotiations. Meanwhile, South Africa has 
considerable leverage over the smaller partners in SACU. Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland receive most of their income from customs controlled by South 
Africa. For these countries the end of SACU would be a real economic disaster: "70% 
of government revenue of Swaziland and 60% of Lesotho's come through distribution 
of SACU income, which the signing of the interim EPA threatens to destroy. 
Economists in the region believe that Lesotho could lose up to 25% of its GDP 
immediately and for Swaziland the decrease would be 20%. This contraction would 
have a devastating effect on growth, jobs and combating poverty "(Walker, 2009). 
 
Central Africa 
The EU negotiates the EPA with Central Africa with eight countries: Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
São Tomé and Príncipe. Cameroon is the only country in this group which has signed 
an interim EPA with the EU and exports to the EU duty and quota free, while on its 
part Cameroon is committed to gradually liberalise up to 80% of exports of EU for the 
period 2010-2025.  
In early 2011, the EU and the countries of Central Africa renewed negotiations 
after two years of inactivity due to the reorganisation of the Secretariat of the Economic 
Community of Central African States.  
Throughout the negotiations one of the problems is that the countries of Central 
Africa are very different in economic terms – only Congo, Gabon and Cameroon are 
not LDCs. The main obstacle in the negotiations so far are the rules for market access. 
Cameroon signed an interim EPA, but it seems to complicate rather than simplify the 
process of negotiations – other countries refuse to accept as a reference the scheme 
for tariff reduction agreed by Cameroon. This leads to a situation in which, for a 
regional EPA to be concluded, either Cameroon must increase their own duties to the 
level of other countries in the region, or the other countries need to reduce their duties 
more rapidly than they want. The vision of EU is that 80% of the products to be 
liberalised within 15 years. Central Africa rejected the proposal to EU to include the 
most-favoured-nation rule in the EPA, and in the last round of negotiations the Union 
agreed to waive the disputed clause. A major problem in the negotiation of non-tariff 
barriers are the used by Chad export and by Cameroon import prohibitions and 
restrictions. 
 
Eastern and Southern Africa 
The region of Eastern and Southern Africa has a very diverse composition. It 
consists of countries of the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan), 
Southern Africa countries (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and several island states 
in the Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles). All countries 
are members of COMESA. Six countries (Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and 
Madagascar, Zambia and the Comoros) who have agreed an interim EPA with the EU, 
are entitled to duty and quota free export with transition periods for rice and sugar. In 
return, the EU receives the right of duty free export for the majority of commodities, 
with each country negotiating an individual liberalisation timetable. 
One of the main obstacles in the negotiation process is namely the 
heterogeneous nature of the region. Therefore, EU officials point out that an EPA with 
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variable geometry is possible, i.e. some countries to take on more commitments than 
others. Other contentious issues in the negotiations are the most-favoured-nation 
treatment and the removal of export taxes and guarantees. EU wants to exclude any 
future amendment of tariffs, which is perceived by the Eastern and Southern Africa 
group as impeding their ability to eventually introduce a common customs tariff within 
COMESA. The parties agreed that the standstill clause will not apply, at LDCs for the 
goods in the list of exceptions. The discussion on the standstill clause stresses the 
need for a better balance between the own regional integration process in the region 
and the conclusion of the EPA negotiations. In the long term, this will allow for 
complete integration, while the current approach could interfere in the internal process 
of integration in COMESA. 
 
East African Community 
On October 16, 2014 the East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda) signed a comprehensive EPA with the EU. The agreement 
covers trade in goods, development cooperation and include clauses for further 
discussion of the chapters relating to services and procedures. EPA is in full 
compliance with the common external tariff of the EAC and supports the ambitious 
integration project of the community. It is in a process of ratification, but all countries 
have signed interim agreements with the EU, which are incorporated in the overall 
EPA and can export to the EU duty and quota free, with transition periods for rice and 
sugar. Over the next 25 years EAC will liberalize 82.6% of imports from the EU. 
One of the specific challenges negotiations with the group of EAC is the 
complexity of the processes of regional integration in the region. Four countries are 
members of COMESA and until 2007 are part of the negotiation process between EU 
and COMESA. Then EAC decided to conduct negotiations for a separate EPA. The 
fifth member of the EAC – Tanzania, is part of SADC. The request of the EAC is to 
entirely remove the most-favoured-nation clause. Another still unresolved contentious 
issue are export taxes. EAC argues that under certain circumstances it is necessary 
to maintain export taxes – e.g. in terms of achieving development objectives, 
diversification of income and food security and environmental considerations. 
 
2.3. Impact of EPAs on regional integration in Africa 
EPA is an ambitious and innovative policy heading towards growth and 
development in ACP regions. For the ACP signatories, it combines immediate gains 
(market access, some relaxation of rules of origin, financial assistance targeted to 
EPAs needs), significant commitments (liberalization towards EU goods and services 
within EPA regions, transparency and predictability of business rules) and medium-to-
long term opportunities (in exports, investments and regional trade, enhanced 
cooperation). It is also associated with risks (business closures, budget restrictions). 
As the EU is the biggest trade partner and the main donor for most ACP states, the 
strategy has the potential to impulse a significant development impetus. The EPA 
strategy is global and its various pillars – trade, services, regional integration, 
cooperation, aid – are mutually supportive. Therefore the partial African agreements 
which address trade in goods and some technical cooperation cannot achieve the 
development benefits attached to the overall strategy. 
Despite the stated goal to promote regional integration, in Africa the impact of 
EPAs on regional integration is disappointing. The poor results are particularly striking 
in Western and Central Africa, where negotiations did not create the hoped-for group 
dynamic. It is obvious that the opportunities offered by the EPAs are not sufficient to 
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motivate further regional integration. In fact, the forces that oppose African integration 
seem to have spilled over into the EPA negotiations, rather than bringing about an 
integration impetus. The main criticisms concerns the ability of EPAs to deliver their 
development benefits.  
Although the overall assessment suggests poor progress towards African 
integration, positive impacts do exist and need to be fairly underlined. They include an 
initial impetus, the EAC agreement, and to some extent the SADC-group agreement. 
The EPAs process contributed to integration incentives and to the implementation of 
the first FTAs and CUs in African RECs. The EU-EAC EPA is a successful outcome 
for regional integration and the EPA between the EU and the SADC group presents 
some potential for enhanced regional integration. Aside from the EAC and SADC, the 
agreements lack the ability to generate regional impetus. More than half of the sub-
Saharan African countries remain outside any form of acting EPAs, which limits the 
geographical scope of possible integration dynamics that might come from EPAs. 
The EU and the ACP states agreed on the significance of regional integration 
both as a central objective and a tool to achieve other aims of the agreements. EPAs 
are an ambitious and innovative attempt to use external leverage to strengthen 
economic integration. However the EPA process added a layer of new groupings to 
the already complex map of African integration. Except for EAC, none of the other EPA 
negotiating configurations coincide with the existing African RECs. The poor progress 
so far is an evidence that the African regional process is not mature. Economic 
integration still lacks genuine political support and commitment in Africa. The 
economic integration initiatives rub against the inability of individual countries to 
consent the necessary transfers of sovereignty. Insufficient institutional capacity and 
a failure to prioritise objectives pose additional obstacles. 
Another obstacle to the conclusion of EPA negotiations is that many African 
countries already have preferential access to the EU market either through the 
“Anything but arms” initiative or under the GSP, without the obligation to liberalise their 
own market for the EU. 
Although slower than envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement terms, the 
negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements with the African regions of the ACP 
group progress, especially in the last two years, when the deadlock in the negotiations 
with the regions of West Africa and SADC was broken. Almost everywhere a major 
problem remains the most favoured nation clause, but the results of negotiations with 
the EAC and SADC are promising with respect to other regions in Africa. There is yet 
no full EPA with any of these regions in force, but such could be soon expected, 
especially regarding the EAC, SADC and West Africa regions, where the agreements 
are in the process of final completion and ratification. 
 
3. Trends in international trade between EU and EPA regions in Africa 
EU is a vital destination for African exports. Moreover, the Union is not only a 
major source of foreign investment, but also an essential factor for the integration of 
the continent into the global economy (Mbeki, 2011). Although many of the African 
countries are small and underdeveloped, these with which the EU negotiates EPAs 
together occupy one of the leading places like trading partner – in 2013 they rank fifth 
in overall volume of trade flows with a share of 4.8% and a value of 165 Billion EUR. 
From this perspective African countries are sixth in EU imports after China, Russia, 
USA, Switzerland and Norway with a share of 5.1% (86 Billion EUR), while in exports 
they rank fifth after the US, China, Switzerland and Russia with 4.6% (79 Billion). 
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3.1. Dynamics of EU trade with African EPA regions  
In 2013 African countries participating in the Cotonou Agreement are 
responsible for just over half of the continent's trade with the EU (51.4%). For the same 
year, the Union’s imports from them is nearly 86 Billion, while exports are 79 Billion 
EUR. Both indicators are close as shares of EU trade with Africa – 51 and 52%. For 
the period 2003-2013, exports grew faster than imports both as a share, as well as in 
value – by 41 Billion EUR (2.1 times) and 42 Billion EUR (just over 2.15 times). 
In 2009 a decline is observed in both indicators (respectively with 19 Billion 
EUR in imports and 11 Billion in exports), which could be explained with the impact of 
the global crisis, especially in terms of EU imports from the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In subsequent years, however, this decline was compensated - for exports in 
2010, and for imports – in 2011. At the end of the period the value of exports remained 
relatively stable, rising at a slower pace than before 2009 – with nearly 3 Billion EUR 
(4%) from 2011 to 2013. There is a serious increase in imports in 2012 over the 
previous year (9 Billion), but in 2013 the volume of trade returned to the levels of 2011 
which could be seen as a post-effect of the Eurozone crisis. 
The trends are similar to those in these in EU’s total trade, although in 
comparison with the Union trade flows to Sub-Saharan Africa increase slightly faster 
– by 29% for imports and 14% of exports. This leads to an increased share of African 
countries covered by the Cotonou Agreement in EU’s total trade – from 4.3 percent in 
2003 to 4.8% in 2013. The increase in imports is more significant as a share than the 
one in exports – respectively by 0.7 and 0.4 percentage points. This could be explained 
by the fact that, unlike imports from African countries, after the increase in 2012 in 
2013 EU’s total imports decreased below 2011 levels. 
In 2013, the largest trade partner of EU in the regions negotiating Economic 
Partnership Agreements (see Figure 2) is that of West Africa – 69 Billion EUR (2% of 
EU’s total trade), followed by SADC – 64 Billion (1.9%). Significantly lower are the values 
of trade flows with the regions of Central Africa – 17 Billion (0.5%), Eastern and Southern 
Africa – 9 Billion (0.3%) and the East African Community – nearly 6 Billion (0.2%). 
 
 
Figure 2. Trade flows between the EU and African EPA regions (Billion Euro) 
Source: Eurostat – EU trade since 1988 by SITC database (DS-018995) and own 
calculations.  
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The situation is similar for imports – here West Africa has a share of 44% of EU 
imports from the regions of the continent (38 Billion EUR), the Southern African 
Development Community – 36% (31 Billion), Central Africa – 12% (12 Billion), Eastern 
and Southern Africa – 5% (4 Billion), and the EAC – 3% (2 Billion EUR). Things are 
different in exports – EU sells most to SADC – 33 Billion EUR (42% of exports to Sub-
Saharan Africa), followed by West Africa – 30 Billion (38%) while the three smaller 
regions maintain their positions respectively with 7, 5 and 4 Billion, but with a slight 
difference in their shares - respectively 9, 6 and 4%. 
For the period 2003-2013, the volume of EU trade with the countries of the 
region of West Africa has increased almost three times. The increase is highest 
compared to all other regions and with over 30% more than the average for Africa, 
and 2.1 times higher than the average for the countries of the continent within the 
EPA negotiation framework. The volume of total trade in 2013 is nearly 69 Billion 
EUR, of which a large part is in imports - 38 Billion. Within the period under review 
this region replaces SADC as a leading trade partner of the EU – mainly because 
the almost double increase in the value of imports from 2010 to 2012 (from 21.7 to 
42.4 Billion EUR). For the entire period of EU imports increased significantly (over 
three times) – from 12.5 to 38 Billion EUR, while exports increased less (2.5 times) 
– from 12.5 to 30 Billion EUR). Both indicators have a slight decline in 2009, but it is 
compensated in the following year, and in 2011 a significant increase is observed 
(55% import and 22% export). The region occupies 2% of the total trade flows of the 
EU (2.3% in imports and 1.7% in exports) and just over one fifth (21.4%) of EU’s 
trade with Africa (respectively 22.7% of imports and 19.9% of exports). For the entire 
period studied the trade balance of the EU remains negative – it grows from 44 Million 
in 2003 to 7.8 Billion in 2013, being highest in 2012 - more than 13.5 Billion EUR. 
EU’s trade with the region of West Africa is dominated by Nigeria (59%), followed by 
Ghana (11%) and Côte d’Ivoire (8%). These are the three countries which realise 
more than 90% of the value of imports (respectively 75, 9 and 9%), while in exports 
leader, albeit with a lower share is Nigeria (39%), followed by Togo, Ghana and 
Senegal (with 11% each). 
Second place as trade partner of EU among the EPA regions in 2013 occupies 
the region of the Southern African Development Community – 64.3 Billion EUR, or 
39% of EU trade with them (36% in imports and 42% in exports). The share of the 
region of EU trade is 1.9% of the total volume of extra-Community trade. At the 
beginning of the period SADC is the leader among the other ACP regions (35.1 Billion 
EUR in 2003), but as already mentioned in 2012 it was replaced by West Africa. In 
2003, imports exceeded exports by about 20% - respectively 19 and 16 Billion EUR, 
while in 2013 the values of the two indicators are almost equal (though with a slight 
preponderance of exports) – respectively 31 and 33 Billion EUR. It is obvious that 
while by 2011 the trade balance was negative, in the last two years of the period it 
becomes positive, mainly due to the decrease in imports in 2012 and 2013 
(respectively by 1 and 3 Billion EUR). The region retains its leading position as an 
export destination for the EU throughout the period (in 2013 – 1.9% of extra-
Community exports, 21.7% of exports to the African ACP regions), but as a source 
of imports in recent years it has been overtaken again by West Africa. In 2009, both 
in imports and exports is observed the characteristic for all ACP regions decline in 
trade with the EU (by 8 and 4 Billion EUR), which was compensated for both 
indicators in 2011. The overall increase in the volume of trade for the entire period 
studied was 1.8 times, but due to the marked drop in imports in recent years, they 
have increased in 2013 compared to 2003 by 1.6 times, while the increase in exports 
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is more than double. The undisputed leader in the trade of EU with the Southern 
African Development Community is South Africa, which accounts for approximately 
two thirds of its total value – nearly 3/4 of exports and half of the imports. Another 
country with a strong presence in EU trade is Angola (24% of trade, 30% of imports 
and 19% of exports). 
During the 2003-2013 period trade of the European Union with the region of 
Central Africa grows by 2.2 times, reaching 17.4 Billion EUR. Here too EU imports 
increased faster than exports – respectively 2.4 and 2 times. In 2013 the volume of 
trade amounted to 17.4 Billion EUR, with imports exceeding exports by about 50% 
(respectively 10.4 and 7 Billion EUR). Exports grew gradually through all the years of 
the period (3.5 Billion EUR in 2003), while in 2009 imports decreased by almost half 
(to 5.2 Billion EUR), which was compensated in 2011. Throughout the period the 
negative balance of trade balance increased and in 2013 it reached 3.5 Billion EUR. 
In the same year Central Africa is third among other regions for EPAs with 10.5% of 
the volume of EU trade with African ACP countries (respectively - 12.2% of imports 
and 8.8% of exports). The share of the region in EU extra-Community trade trade is 
small - 0.5%. The major trade partners of EU here are Equatorial Guinea (26%), 
Cameroon (24%), Gabon (17%) and Congo (16%). Their ranking in imports is the 
same (respectively with 39, 23, 14 and 13%), while in exports leader is Cameroon 
(25%), followed by Gabon (21%), Congo (20%) and DR Congo (15%). 
The region of Eastern and Southern Africa occupies a modest place in the 
trade of EU – only 0.3% from extra-Community and 5.5% of African ACP regions 
trade. In 2013 the volume of trade is 9.1 Billion EUR, and here trade flows increased 
the least during the period - 1.3 times (from 6.8 Billion EUR in 2003). Unlike most 
other regions in Eastern and Southern Africa exports exceed imports during the 
reference period (except for the first two years), the positive value of the trade 
balance reaching 1.3 Billion EUR in 2013, when exports exceed imports by more 
than 25% (respectively 5.2 and 3.9 Billion EUR). The trend is reinforced by the fact 
that exports grew significantly faster (0.6 times for the entire period) of exports, which 
almost retain their 2003 value (3.4 Billion EUR). EU trade with the region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa is distributed across multiple countries. The largest trading 
partners are Mauritius (21%) and Ethiopia (19%), followed by Madagascar (14%), 
Sudan (12%) and Zambia (11%). The main sources of imports are again Mauritius 
(28%), Madagascar (19%) and Ethiopia (14%) and exports are mainly directed to 
Ethiopia (23%), Sudan (18%) and Mauritius (17%). 
The size of the smallest among the EPA regions – the East African Community 
ranks it last as a trading partner of the EU with a trade volume of 5.7 Billion EUR in 
2013, which represents 3.4% of EU trade with African ACP regions and only 0.2% of 
the total volume of extra-Community trade. Exports prevail throughout the period with 
the exception of the two years in the beginning. In 2013 it significantly exceeds 
imports (respectively 3.5 and 2.1 Billion EUR), and its increase compared to 2003 is 
over 2.2 times. Imports increased less – 1.2 times. Thus, in 2013 the trade balance 
is positive by 1.4 Billion EUR. Both indicators observed the characteristic for the ACP 
regions decline in 2009, but here it was in minimal terms (about 4%), and was caught 
up in 2010. Trade with EAC is dominated by Kenya (53%) which occupies more than 
half of both imports and exports in the region, followed by Tanzania (26%) and 
Uganda (16%). 
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3.2. Commodity structure of EU trade with African EPA regions1 
In 2013 African trade consists mainly of fuels (41%, 130 Billion EUR), followed 
by machinery (21%, 66 Billion), other manufactures (11%, 36 Billion), food (8%, 27 
Billion) and chemicals (7%, 23 Billion). Imports are mainly concentrated in primary 
products – dominated by fuels (64%, 107 Billion EUR), followed by other manufactures 
and food (8% each). Exports are relatively diversified – leading is machinery (36%, 56 
Billion EUR), followed by fuels and other manufactures (15%), chemicals (12%), food 
(9%) and miscellaneous manufactures (7 %). 
Similar is the commodity structure of trade of EU with the EPA negotiating 
countries of Africa (see Figure 3) – the first place is for fuels (37%, 60 Billion EUR), 
followed by machinery (21%, 34 Billion), other manufactures (12%, 21 Billion), food 
(11%, 17 Billion) and chemicals (7%, 11 Billion). Fuel imports have a slightly lower 
share of total imports of the EU (56%) at the expense of the more significant share of 
other manufactures and food (13% each), while the export structure is identical to that 
trade with the entire continent –specific product groups’ share differs with 1-2 
percentage points. 
Total trade with the ACP countries is little more than half of that of the whole of 
Africa (51%), but there are significant differences in individual commodity groups – 
largest share in African trade have unclassified elsewhere goods (86%), beverages 
and tobacco (81%), crude materials and foods (64% each) and lowest – fats and oils 
and miscellaneous manufactures (37% each). These variations are more pronounced 
in imports where beverages and tobacco and unclassified elsewhere goods coming 
from Sub-Saharan Africa occupy almost the entire volume of imports from Africa (98 
and 96%). Higher is the share of crude materials and other manufactures (84% each) 
and food (77%), while oils and fats take only 20% and miscellaneous manufactures – 
15%. Only three product groups deviate seriously from the total share of exports – the 
largest share is for beverages and tobacco (73%) and unclassified elsewhere goods 
(67%), while the smallest share have crude materials (30%). 
Sub-Saharan Africa occupies a significant place in the total extra-Community 
trade in food (11%), fuels (10%) and beverages and tobacco (8%). These are the 
leading commodity groups in this indicator in imports (12%, 14% and 10%), followed 
by crude materials (9%) and other manufactures (7%), while fuels (10 %), food (9%) 
and oils and fats (8%) have a more significant share in exports. 
Although the total volume of EU imports and exports to African ACP countries 
is almost equal in 2013 (respectively 86 and 80 Billion EUR), there are serious 
differences in the trade balance the in individual commodity groups – the balance is 
highly positive for machinery (27 Billion EUR), chemicals (8 Billion) and miscellaneous 
manufactures (4 Billion) but has a significant negative expression in fuels (35 Billion), 
food (6 Billion) and crude materials (5 Billion). 
For the 2003-2013 period the highest increase is observed in trade with fuel – 
49% annual average growth (a.a.g.), a total increase of 49 Billion EUR. In all other 
commodity groups increase is much less (15-20% a.a.g.), the slowest growth is in 
machines and miscellaneous manufactures (13% a.a.g.). However, the growth is 
1 Further in the paper the respective commodity groups (according to SITC, rev. 4) are 
presented in an abbreviated form, as follows: food and live animals – food; crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels - crude materials; mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials – 
fuels; animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes – oils and fats; chemicals and related 
products – chemicals; manufactured goods classified chiefly by material – other 
manufactures; machinery and transport equipment – machinery; miscellaneous 
manufactured articles – miscellaneous manufactures. 
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substantial as a value in machinery (11 Billion), crude materials (8 Billion), food and 
chemicals (6 Billion each). The fuels are the product group in which there is the 
greatest increase in both import and export (respectively 5 and 13 times). The more 
serious change in exports could be explained by the lower value in the early years of 
the period – less than 1 Billion EUR, while for imports it is just over 10 Billion. The 
great increase in the value of trade in fuels can be explained partly by the dramatic 
rise in prices of these raw materials on global markets, but is also influenced by the 
long-term concessions and contracts between some countries in the EU and those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For all other products the growth in exports for the period is 2-2.5 
times, and in terms of value it is significant in machinery (12 Billion EUR), chemicals 
and other manufactures (5 Billion each) and food (4 Billion). The increase in imports 
is weaker – about 11-13% annually for all products except fuels (43% a.a.g., 37 Billion 
EUR), other processed products (25%, 3 Billion) and food (19%, 2 Billion), while 
imports of machinery, and miscellaneous manufactures and unclassified elsewhere 
goods fall by 0.5-1 Billion EUR each for the period. 
 
 
Figure 3. EU – Sub-Saharan Africa international trade commodity structure 
(Billion Euro) 
Source: Eurostat – EU trade since 1988 by SITC database (DS-018995) and own 
calculations.  
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Billion in 2013) than in exports (8 Billion EUR in 2009, while in 2013 there even is an 
increase in total trade by 1 Billion EUR). 
EU Trade with the largest trade partner among EPA regions – West Africa, is 
dominated by fuels (60%, 41 Billion EUR), followed by machinery and food (12%, 8 
Billion EUR each). The first completely dominate imports (80%), and are leading in 
exports (36%), where a significant place is occupied by machinery (27%), while food 
has relatively equal share in imports and in exports (12% in each). Trade in fuels with 
this region has the highest share in the trade of EU with Sub-Saharan Africa (69%), 
which is much more pronounced for exports than imports (respectively 88% and 63%). 
In this product group West Africa has a distinct share of total extra-Community trade of 
the EU – 6.7%. These are products where the increase in the trade volume is highest – 
35 Billion EUR (59% a.a.g., 5 times for imports and over 13 times in exports), while for 
all other growth is 11-17% annually. The significant increase, especially in exports of 
fuels leads to an increasing negative trade balance in the period – 8 Billion EUR in 2013. 
The negative balance in trade with fuels (19 Billion EUR) is compensated in part by the 
positive in machinery (8 Billion), chemicals and crude materials (2 Billion). 
EU trade with the Southern African Development Community EPA region is 
concentrated in machinery (30%, 19 Billion EUR), other manufactures (21%, 14 Billion 
EUR) and fuels (17%, 11 Billion EUR). The first occupy almost half of the exports to the 
region (49%), while the other two groups – almost 2/3 of imports (respectively 28 and 
32%). For the 2003-2013 period the most serious increase is observed in fuels (8 Billion 
EUR), machinery (6 Billion) and crude materials (5 Billion). The growth of exports is 
generally larger than that of imports (respectively 2.1 and 1.6 times), which reflects in 
the change in the trade balance – at the beginning of the period it has a negative 
expression of 3 Billion EUR, while at the end it is the same, but with a positive value. In 
2013, the balance is highly positive in trade with machinery (13 Billion EUR), chemicals, 
miscellaneous manufactures and food (by 2.5 Billion EUR), and negative in fuels (9 
Billion) and crude materials (4 Billion). SADC holds an important place in the total trade 
of EU with Sub-Saharan Africa with unclassified elsewhere goods (75%, 86% of 
imports), crude materials (67%, 78% of imports), fats and oils (64%, 75 % of exports) 
and machinery (56%, 81% of imports). The region has a relatively strong presence in 
extra-Community trade in crude materials (3.7%) and beverages and tobacco (3.6%). 
Although much smaller in volume (17 Billion EUR in 2013), the commodity 
structure of EU trade with the region of Central Africa is very similar to that of the West 
Africa region – dominated by fuels (45%, 71% of imports and only 4% of exports), 
followed by machinery (16%, 39% of exports and less than 0.5% of imports), crude 
materials (13% for both indicators) and food (9%, 16% of exports and 6% of imports). 
The trade balance is negative (3.5 Billion EUR), but the high import of fuels is 
somewhat compensated for by the positive value of the balance in machines (2.7 
Billion EUR). Exports grew more slowly than imports, leading to an increase in the 
current account deficit. The most significant growth during the period was in trade with 
fuels (6 Billion EUR, 39% on average) – significantly higher in exports (8.5 times) than 
in imports (4.2 times). Although slower and with lower values  trade also increased in 
and other manufactures (by 1 Billion EUR each, respectively 13 and 17% a.a.g). The 
main product traded with the region (fuels) occupy 13% of EU trade with all African 
ACP countries, while for all other product groups the share is about 9-10% (with the 
exception of very weak presence of oils and fats – only 3%). Only fuels and have a 
distinct place in EU extra-Community trade - 1.2% of total trade, 1.5% of imports. 
Despite the relatively low share of Eastern and Southern Africa of EU trade with 
African EPA regions (5.5%), the region has a serious place in miscellaneous 
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manufactures (17%, 1 Billion EUR), beverages and tobacco and food (13%, 2 Billion 
EUR each). The leading product groups in U trade with Eastern and Southern Africa are 
food (27%) and machinery (24%) – the first occupy 44% of imports, while the second – 
42% of EU exports to the region. As already noted, EU trade with Eastern and Southern 
Africase increases the slowest compared to all other regions (1.4 times). The increase 
is slightly higher in chemicals and crude materials (respectively 2.8 and 2 times). 
However, one could regard as positive the fact that exports grew faster than imports 
(respectively 1.6 and 1.2 times), which leads to a positive balance of 1.3 Billion EUR in 
2013, mainly due to positive values in machinery (2.1 Billion) and chemicals (0.9 Billion), 
the only product group with a substantial negative balance being food (1 Billion EUR). 
The smallest of the EPA regions – the East African Community, occupies the 
last place in the trade of EU with Sub-Saharan Africa (3.4%, 5.7 Billion EUR), the only 
products with a distinct presence being crude materials (10%) and chemicals (8%). 
The most traded commodities are machinery (30%), food (23%), chemicals and crude 
materials (13%). Exports are concentrated in machinery and chemicals (46 and 22%), 
while imports – in food and crude materials (51 and 29%). Exports grew approximately 
twice as fast as imports (respectively 21 and 11% a.a.g.), especially in fuels (5.5 
times), beverages and tobacco (3.8 times) and food (3.3 times). The highest increase 
as value in exports is in machinery (1 Billion EUR). The faster pace of growth in exports 
leads to a positive trade balance (1.4 Billion in 2013). 
 
3.3. Summarised assessment of the trends in international trade 
The analysis of the dynamics of the EU's trade with African EPA regions shows 
that its value grew slightly faster than that of the total extra-Community trade flows. 
Trade dynamics in different regions are different because of their specific 
characteristics, but the countries which have signed interim EPAs are taking more 
significant share of trade of the EU with the corresponding regions – although they 
have not become regional leaders yet, trade with them is growing faster compared to 
other countries in the regions. This trend is more obvious in terms of EU imports from 
these countries, as interim EPAs allow these countries to export almost all goods duty-
free without restrictions. 
The analysis of the commodity structure of EU trade with EPA regions in Africa 
once again underlines the strong dependence of Sub-Saharan Africa on primary 
sector exports and processed products imports. This is a clear indicator of the potential 
opportunities that are available to the industrialised countries to the export processed 
products to this part of the world. This trend is characteristic of EU trade both with the 
region and with each of the existing EPA blocks. Different trends are observed in trade 
flows with the individual EPA regions, with the growing current account deficit in trade 
with West and Central Africa being only partly compensated by the reverse trend in 
the other three regions. The volume of trade in all commodity groups has a clear 
upward trend, with the exception of 2009, when there is a decline in the value of trade 
in all products as a result of the global financial crisis. Decrease is observed in 2013 
as well, but only in imports of certain product groups. 
 
Conclusion: some general questions for the future 
The study implicitly raises several more general questions that are not in its 
specific subject, but are closely connected.  
First, the assessment of the EU's trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa 
clearly shows that the Union does not devote the necessary preferential attention to 
the African continent, despite that the countries within EPA negotiations are one of its 
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main trading partners. This is related mainly to the efficiency of the development policy 
of the EU, which obviously needs serious reconsideration. Moreover financial support 
for ACP countries, rendered through the EDF, is contractually established in the form 
of minor annual instalments. Besides these, however, many European countries 
provide additional support to their African partners (and former colonies), driven 
primarily by their own national interest rather than by the stated EU objectives and 
principles in its role as a global player. 
Second, the analysis of the regulatory framework of the EU-ACP relations 
shows that the general development policy of the Union is restricted by a narrow legal 
framework while the goals it sets are too declarative, and only at the political level. 
Setting priorities and specific actions often does not include the real stakeholders – 
both representatives of developing countries that this policy affects directly, as well as 
the acting in the field of trade and investment with African countries European 
business. Therefore, for the stated strategy of the Union to support the development 
and integration into the world economy of developing countries to obtain practical 
implementation, greater attention should be given to the relationship between foreign 
trade and development aid. Indicative in this respect is that while the EU and US, 
which are the first and the second largest donor of official development assistance, 
direct their actions towards promoting integration efforts, the "new" world powers 
prefer bilateral negotiations and the support of specific countries according to their 
own economic and geopolitical benefits. 
Third, although the foundation of the new framework for trade relations with 
Sub-Saharan Africa – the Economic Partnership Agreements, is based on the principle 
"to help these countries help themselves", it also remains rather declarative. The 
reason is that the EU and particularly some individual Member States, like the other 
major world economic powers, participate in the global struggle for resources, 
protecting primarily their own interests. This, together with the aggressive penetration 
of new global economic players in Africa requires a thorough rethinking of the policy 
towards the countries on the continent, not only from the EU point of view, but in the 
national foreign trade strategies of Member States as well. 
Moreover, these questions are determinative for the future EU-ACP relations, 
for the future of Union’s trade policy, and more generally, for the future of the EU as a 
global actor. 
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Annex. Maps of African RECs and EPA regions 
 
African RECs 
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Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD): Benin,Burkina Faso,Cape Verde,Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad,Djibouti,Egypt,Eritrea,Gambia,Ghana,Guinea-Bissau,Guinea,Kenya,Liberia,Libya, 
Mali,Mauritania,Morocco,Niger,Nigeria,São Tomé & Príncipe,Senegal,Sierra Leone,Somalia,Sudan,Togo,Tunisia. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): Burundi,Comoros,Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Djibouti,Egypt,Eritrea,Ethiopia,Kenya,Libya,Madagascar,Malawi,Mauritius,Rwanda,Seychelles,Sudan,Swaziland, 
Uganda,Zambia,Zimbabwe 
East African Community (EAC): Burundi,Kenya,Rwanda,Tanzania,Uganda 
Economic Community of Central African States (ЕССАS): Angola,Burundi,Cameroon,Central African Republic, 
Chad,Democratic Republic of Congo,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,Congo,São Tomé and Príncipe 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Benin,Burkina Faso,Cape Verde,Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia,Ghana,Guinea,Guinea-Bissau,Liberia,Mali,Niger,Nigeria,Senegal,Sierra Leone,Togo 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Djibouti,Eritrea,Ethiopia,Kenya,Somalia,Sudan,Uganda 
Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola,Botswana,Democratic Republic of Congo,Lesotho, 
Madagascar,Malawi,Mauritius,Mozambique,Namibia,Seychelles,South Africa,Swaziland,Tanzania,Zambia,Zimbabwe 
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